Date first published: 13/01/2026
Key sectors: all; oil and gas
Key risks: political stability; governability; economic risks; regional escalation; regional conflict
Risk development
Early on 3 January United States (US) President Donald Trump’s administration launched an overnight military operation in Caracas and surrounding states, with US Special Forces capturing president Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. They were subsequently flown to New York to face narco-terrorism, drug trafficking and weapons charges, which Maduro denies, stating he was “kidnapped” and insisting that he was still Caracas’s legitimate president. On 7 January Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello reported that 100 people were killed in the strikes. Subsequently, Trump stated he was placing Venezuela under US control until Washington determined that a “safe, proper and judicious” political transition could take place, and that the US would tap into and rebuild Venezuela’s oil industry, which has the world’s largest reserves.
On 5 January Vice President Delcy Rodriguez was sworn in as interim leader. Rodriguez denounced the US operation as a violation of sovereignty and an oil grab, but on 4 January she signalled willingness to cooperate with the US. Washington has not recognised Rodriguez’s legitimacy but signalled it would work with her for now, warning her tenure could be short if she fails to meet US demands.
On 6 January Trump stated that under a new deal with Rodriguez’s government, Caracas would transfer 30-50 million barrels of sanctioned oil to the US, to be sold at market prices, with proceeds controlled by Washington. Amid increased cooperation under Rodriguez, including Caracas’s release of several political figures, on 9 January Trump stated that he cancelled a “second wave of attacks” on Venezuela.
Why it matters
Domestically, Maduro’s ouster removes a long-standing, polarising authoritarian figure and upends the political status quo, risking a power vacuum that could be exploited by competing political, military and paramilitary actors. It remains unclear whether the operation will result in regime change or merely recalibrate the existing Chavista power structure that endured under Maduro. The balance between entrenched elites, the interim leadership under Rodriguez and opposition forces will determine whether Caracas moves toward a negotiated democratic transition, prolonged instability or authoritarian continuity. Control over the state, the oil sector and basic governance functions remains in flux, with direct implications for the country’s economic recovery and political stability.
Reactions across Latin America have been sharply divided, reflecting broader polarisation along ideological lines. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, Mexico and Uruguay have criticised the US operation as a violation of international law that threatens regional stability, while Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay and Guyana have welcomed Maduro’s ouster. Combined with Trump’s explicit statements about controlling Venezuela’s oil industry, the intervention demonstrates US readiness to use force to shape regional politics, akin to a reinforced Monroe Doctrine, and will likely revive historically prevalent anti-US sentiment.
The US intervention signals a reassertion of hemispheric primacy, prioritising force over negotiation to maintain influence in the Americas and potentially turning the region into a stage for renewed great‑power rivalry. China – historically Venezuela’s largest crude buyer and a major financier under long‑standing oil‑for‑loans arrangements – has condemned the operation as a violation of sovereignty and faces risks to its economic and strategic interests. Russia, while economically less dominant, has also extended loans to Venezuela and maintains energy and defence cooperation with Caracas and similarly condemned the operation. Their involvement underscores that competition over influence, energy access and geopolitical alignment in Latin America now forms part of a broader global contest between major powers.
Globally, the US military action to remove a sitting head of state and transfer him to US custody is unprecedented in recent decades and represents the most direct intervention in Latin America since the 1989 Panama invasion. While Trump’s administration officially justified the operation using narco‑terrorism and drug trafficking indictments against Maduro, the raid has been widely condemned as a breach of international law under the UN Charter. The raid weakens international norms, potentially lowering the threshold for unilateral action by other major powers and providing Beijing and Moscow with a precedent to justify interventions in pursuit of strategic interests.
Background
Since becoming president in April 2013, Maduro’s rule has been marked by economic collapse, hyperinflation, shortages, mass protests and political repression, prompting the exodus of around eight million Venezuelans. Maduro consolidated power through control of the judiciary, security forces and state institutions. Elections in May 2018 and July 2024, which saw Maduro remain in power, were widely criticised as unfree and unfair by the opposition and international community. Opposition protests were brutally crushed, with hundreds killed and thousands detained.
Tensions with Washington escalated in 2025, with Trump’s administration doubling its reward for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to US$50m on 7 August and imposing new sanctions on his family on 11 December. Since 2 September, US forces also conducted over 30 lethal strikes on vessels accused of drug trafficking, killing more than 110 people in the Caribbean. On 15 October Trump authorised the CIA to carry out covert operations.
Risk outlook
Political and economic instability in Venezuela is likely to remain high. While many citizens welcomed Maduro’s removal, US oversight of the country and its oil sector risks will risk sparking protests over time, resistance from Chavista loyalists, unrest within the military and security forces and increased activity by armed pro-government groups known as ‘colectivos’. Competing factions among Chavista elites, interim authorities under Rodriguez and opposition groups could clash over control of the state and oil sector. Should Rodriguez’s government fail to align with Washington’s demands, further US military action cannot be ruled out, with Trump warning on 4 January that “she will face a situation probably worse than Maduro” if she refuses to cooperate.
The US raid, combined with Trump’s threats toward Colombia and Mexico and suggestions that Cuba could be next, is likely to heighten regional tensions and sharpen fears of a widening US intervention agenda. His past interest in seizing the Panama Canal and broader coercive rhetoric are intensifying concerns over sovereignty and reinforcing perceptions that Washington is prioritising force over negotiation to sustain regional influence.