Date first published: 24/02/2026
Key sectors: defence and security; energy; logistics
Key risks: tribal violence; targeted attacks; violent clashes; governability; economic risks; supply chain disruption
Risk development
On 14 February Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar ordered a restructuring of southern formations following clashes involving ethnic Tebu fighters across Fezzan province. The move included redeployments, command shuffles and reinforcement of units controlling strategic desert routes near Sebha and Murzuq, South province, and border corridors connecting Chad, Niger and Sudan.
The restructuring followed escalating tensions between LNA-aligned Arab tribal units and Tebu armed groups over checkpoints, smuggling taxation and local authority. Southern Libya remains fragmented among tribal militias, cross-border trafficking networks and residual mercenary formations. Control of these areas carries economic and strategic importance, particularly as instability across the Sahel increases trafficking flows toward the Mediterranean.
Why it matters
Southern Libya underpins multiple illicit economies, including fuel diversion, narcotics, human smuggling and weapons transit linking West Africa to coastal provinces. Haftar’s intervention signalled his intent to consolidate authority over revenue-generating routes rather than relying solely on local patronage. However, doing so risks upsetting delicate tribal balances. Tebu fighters have historically functioned both as security partners and rivals to eastern authorities, depending on local incentives. Moves perceived as favouring Arab tribal allies could deepen grievances and trigger retaliatory mobilisation across Murzuq basin communities.
Regional dynamics further exacerbate security risks. Armed actors displaced by instability in Sudan and Niger increasingly traverse southern Libya, amplifying competition over protection rackets and smuggling taxation. Additionally, ties between Haftar and the Sudan-based Rapid Support Forces (RSF) also risk destabilising the southern border. Any deterioration in Fezzan could disrupt oil infrastructure and migration management efforts supported by European partners and investments in southern energy corridors at a time of renewed foreign interest in Libya’s market.
Background
Since Libya’s post-2011 fragmentation, Fezzan has functioned less as a governed territory than a negotiated marketplace between tribes, armed factions and traffickers. The LNA expanded southward between 2018 and 2020, relying heavily on alliances with local Arab tribes and foreign auxiliaries.
The Tebu community, concentrated around Murzuq and border areas, emerged as key power brokers due to geographic familiarity and transitional kinship networks. While periodically cooperating with Haftar’s forces, Tebu groups have repeatedly clashed with rival Awlad Sleiman and other Arab militias over municipal authority and smuggling routes. The post-2011 collapse also led to the proliferation of arms and drug trafficking, fuelling conflict in the wider Sahel since 2012 and making southern Libya a convergence zone linking Sudanese war economies, Tuareg Nigerian migration routes and Mediterranean departure hubs.
Risk outlook
The structuring is likely to strengthen Haftar’s operational reach across key transit corridors in the short term by reducing fragmentation among LNA-aligned commanders. Increased patrols and command centralisation may temporarily suppress clashes near major centres. Tribal militarisation is unlikely to wane as communities hedge against perceived marginalisation by strengthening their respective security forces. Fezzan is likely to experience episodic violence in the medium term rather than sustained campaigns, particularly over checkpoints, fuel depots or migrant routes if Sahel conflicts continue disrupting local demographics and displacing armed groups.
Haftar’s consolidation poses a strategic risk of deepening the country’s overall territorial divisions. Although it might increase eastern influence ahead of national political talks, relying on tribal security deals for governance remains fragile and could quickly unravel. Effective control of southern Libya will require more than just military changes; it likely needs ongoing economic integration and negotiated tribal agreements, both of which are currently absent. The persistent risk of further clashes will likely continue to fuel political competition in the region.