Date first published: 26/03/2026
Key sectors: all; oil and gas
Key risks: civil unrest; political uncertainty; economic risks; sanctions
Risk development
On 14 March protests against blackouts and food shortages in Moron, Ciego de Avila province, turned violent when protesters vandalised the Communist Party office and other state-run establishments in the area – including a pharmacy and a government market – throwing rocks through windows and setting furniture on fire. Authorities arrested five people following the violent protest, which came amid worsening energy and economic crises in the country.
Why it matters
While strict government control has made protests in the country rare, the number of public displays of dissent – including nightly banging of pots and pans and university student sit-ins – reportedly increased from 30 in January to 130 by mid-March. Rising public dissatisfaction amid the country’s most acute humanitarian crisis yet, after the US effectively severed its access to imported oil, has heightened the communist government’s vulnerability, threatening to unravel its longstanding political stability.
After halting Venezuelan oil shipments following the removal of deposed president Nicolas Maduro in a US military operation on 3 January, Washington tightened its stranglehold by authorising tariffs on countries directly or indirectly providing oil to Havana. In a move that pressured Mexico to suspend its deliveries – which together with Venezuela amounted to three quarters of the island’s oil imports – the US oil blockade left the island reliant on domestic production, accounting for 40 per cent of fuel needs.
The cutoff has triggered fuel rationing and disruptions to essential services, including transportation, health care and waste management, as well as austerity measures. Prolonged nationwide blackouts have disrupted electricity, water pumping, sanitation and agricultural production, heightening food insecurity. This has culminated in the latest 16 March nationwide collapse of the electrical grid, leaving 11 million people without power, underscoring the fragility of the country’s ageing infrastructure.
In turn, this has amplified an ongoing economic crisis and energy vulnerability – marked by shortages of food, fuel, medicine and electricity – leading to soaring inflation and intensifying public hardship, increasing pressure on the government and raising the risk of further unrest.
Background
The exacerbation of Havana’s energy insecurity and economic fragility following the collapse of subsidised oil shipments came amid a six-decade Cold War-era US embargo that has restricted trade, investment and financial transactions with state-controlled companies. Further tightened under US President Donald Trump’s administration, the US sanctions regime amplified macroeconomic distortions under the ruling Communist Party’s centralised model, increasing import and tourism dependence.
Coming on the heels of the worst economic conditions in over 30 years following the COVID-19 pandemic, widespread shortages and power outages previously triggered rare nationwide protests in July 2021, which were swiftly suppressed by security forces. Sustained political stability has remained contingent on the cohesion of the military, intelligence and paramilitary apparatus, which have historically enabled the government to stifle dissent.
The Trump administration’s escalating pressure on President Miguel Diaz-Canel’s government have further deteriorated bilateral relations, with Havana treated as an adversarial state amid intensifying regional geopolitical competition with China. Washington’s recent measures signal a renewed effort to extract political and economic concessions, including alignment with US foreign policy and economic liberalisation.
Risk outlook
The risk of escalating US pressures on Havana increases uncertainty around the likelihood of further civil unrest. As additional US measures – including expanded sanctions, restrictions on remittances and export control – cannot be ruled out given Havana’s rejection of calls for political reform, public grievances are expected to persist and deepen. While the state’s capacity to contain dissent will continue to hinge on the cohesion of the security apparatus, its effectiveness as a deterrent to large-scale protests could erode under sustained social and economic pressures.