Date first published: 23/04/2026
Key sectors: all
Key risks: political stability; governance; policy uncertainty; economic risks
Risk development
On 20 April former president Rumen Radev’s newly formed centre-left Progressive Bulgaria (PB) party won a landslide victory in the 19 April snap parliamentary election with 44.7 per cent of the vote and 135 seats, securing an outright majority in the 240-seat National Assembly. The centre-right GERB-SDS of former prime minister Boyko Borissov came a distant second with 13.4 per cent, its worst result since the party’s founding in 2006. The liberal pro-European We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria (PP-DB) alliance took 12.8 per cent, the ethnic Turkish-linked Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) led by Western-sanctioned oligarch Delyan Peevski received 7.1 per cent, and the far-right pro-Russian Vazrazhdane (Revival) cleared the 4 per cent threshold with 4.3 per cent. Only five parties will sit in the new Assembly, down from nine previously.
Why it matters
Radev’s majority is the first secured by a single party or alliance since 1997, and is likely to ease the prolonged instability that has produced eight elections in five years. The result reflects broad public rejection of the established parties and the oligarchic governance model associated with Borissov and Peevski.
However, Radev’s foreign policy positions will test Bulgaria’s relationships with Brussels and its NATO allies. During his presidency, he repeatedly opposed military aid to Ukraine, called for renewed relations with Moscow based on “mutual respect,” objected to a 10-year defence pact concluded between Bulgaria and Ukraine in March and stated that Crimea “is Russian”. He has criticised European Union (EU) sanctions on Russian energy and opposed Bulgaria’s eurozone accession, which proceeded on 1 January despite his objections. His victory also came after on 12 April Hungarian voters removed Prime Minister Viktor Orban, prompting fears that Radev could play a similar disruptive role as Orban towards the EU’s agenda.
Background
Bulgaria has experienced persistent political instability since 2021, when anti-corruption protests brought down Borissov’s government. Seven subsequent snap elections failed to produce a stable government, with fragmented parliaments and short-lived coalitions collapsing over disputes related to corruption and budgetary policy. The most recent government, a minority coalition led by Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov of GERB, resigned on 11 December 2025 following large-scale protests against a proposed 2026 budget that included tax hikes and increased spending on the security apparatus. The protests were largely driven by Gen-Z but also drew in trade unions, employers’ associations and ethnic minorities, united by opposition to Peevski’s outsized influence over state institutions.
Radev resigned from the presidency on 19 January, one year before the end of his second term, to run in the elections. He formally launched PB on 2 March, building a campaign centred on anti-corruption, cost-of-living pressures and dismantling oligarchic control of state institutions. The party topped the vote in every demographic, including the 18-30 cohort that drove the December protests and despite the PP-DB alliance having led those protests. Voter turnout was around 48.8 per cent, the highest since April 2021.
Risk outlook
Radev’s majority removes the immediate risk of another political deadlock. However, PB was formed barely a month before the election and lacks the institutional depth needed to deliver on its anti-corruption agenda. Constitutional changes to dismantle oligarchic structures would require a supermajority of 160 seats, meaning Radev will likely need cooperation from PP-DB. The concentration of executive power in a single party after years of fragmentation also raises the risk of institutional capture.
Relations will Brussels will be tested under the new administration. However, Radev is unlikely to block major EU decisions on sanctions or Ukraine support outright due to Bulgaria’s reliance on EU funds and defence loans will constrain his room for manoeuvre. The more likely outcome will be similar to Slovakia’s PM Robert Fico’s vocal domestic criticism of EU policy combined with compliance on key collective decisions.