Date first published: 14/07/2026
Key sectors: all
Key risks: political stability; governability
Risk development
On 6 July Hamas’s head of administration Mohammed al-Farra resigned from his position and announced the dissolution of the Government Emergency Committee, the body that has governed Gaza since 2007. This was reportedly done to facilitate the administrative transition process as detailed by the October 2025 ceasefire, with the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) – a committee of Palestinian technocrats – tasked with overseeing the Strip’s future administration under an internationally backed roadmap developed by United States (US) President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace.
Why it matters
Hamas’s announcement appears aimed at countering Israeli claims that it is unwilling to relinquish governance of Gaza. In May, US-appointed Gaza envoy Nickolay Mladenov told the United Nations (UN) Security Council that Hamas was delaying the peace process. The Board of Peace stated it acknowledged Hamas’s announcement but was awaiting concrete action, reiterating its principle of “one authority, one law and one weapon”, with all arms brought under NCAG control. Tel Aviv was also sceptical, with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar dismissing the announcement as a “trick”, stating the group was seeking to retain military control and influence while a technocratic administration would handle civilian services. Hence, the main sticking point remains Hamas’s weapons: Israel insists the group must disarm before any progress can be made, while Hamas contends it will not surrender its arsenal until Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdraw and a Palestinian governing authority is in place.
In an attempt to break this vicious cycle, a Board of Peace official stated that Hamas’ disarmament was no longer a precondition for advancing post-war plans in Gaza, with planning proceeding on a “worst-case scenario” basis. The proposals include a pilot humanitarian zone in Rafah, where IDF would withdraw and be replaced by an International Stabilisation Force (ISF). The NCAG would then enter Gaza to administer the area, working with the ISF to screen Palestinians moving from Hamas-controlled areas into the humanitarian zone. According to some sources, NCAG members opposed the plan, arguing that the humanitarian zone would remain effectively under Israeli control, as IDF would maintain a presence on its outskirts.
Background
Since the US-brokered ceasefire in October 2025, talks on its second phase have stalled over Hamas’s disarmament and Gaza’s reconstruction. Hamas accuses Israel of violating the agreement through continued aid restrictions and strikes, while Tel Aviv states it is targeting Hamas operatives planning attacks, although civilian casualties have been reported. At least 1,005 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza since October 2025, with IDF increasing their control beyond the demarcation line from 53 per cent to about 70 per cent of the territory.
Risk outlook
Hamas is not relinquishing its political or military role in Gaza but is instead stepping back from the direct management of civilian affairs in the territory. Viewed in this context, the move could be interpreted as a goodwill gesture aimed at advancing diplomatic negotiations while allowing Hamas to avoid committing to disarmament before the IDF withdrawal. While the Rafah plan could potentially serve as a model for the whole Strip, it remains theoretical, as it still requires approval from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, which is unlikely to approve even limited IDF withdrawals ahead of the October parliamentary elections.